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ABSTRACT
A preliminary plan is presented for testing a thermionic reactor in
the Plum Brook Space Power Facility (SPF). A technical approach, cost
estimate, manpower estimate, and schedule are presented to cover a 2 year
full power reactor test«
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PRELIMINARY PLAN FOR TESTING A THERMIONIC REACTOR IN THE
PLUM BROOK SPACE POWER FACILITY
by Fred A. Haley
Lewis Research Center
SUMMARY
A preliminary plan was prepared for testing a thermionic reactor at
the NASA Space Power Facility (SPF). The SPF is located at the Plum Brook
Station which is part of the Lewis Research Center. It was assumed that
a sponsoring agency, the Space Nuclear Systems Office, would provide a
reactor with a thermal output of 1500 kilowatts and an electrical output
of 120 kilowatts. The Lewis Research Center would prepare the facility,
provide all test support equipment and conduct a 2 year full power test.
A technical approach was established. Cost and manpower estimates,
and a schedule were prepared. The total Lewis effort was shown to span
6 1/2 years, cost approximately 11 to 14 million dollars and require about
224 man years of engineering and technical manpower.
INTRODUCTION
A thermionic reactor development effort has been sponsored by the
Space Nuclear Systems Office (SNSO) for the past several years. Prior to
and during 1972, test sites were being evaluated for a reactor demonstra-
tion test. One of the possible test sites considered was the Space Power
Facility (SPF) located at the Lewis Research Center's Plum Brook Station.
A study was conducted to establish the technical feasibility, manpower
and funding requirements, and schedular aspects of the SPF test. The study
was transmitted to the SNSO in three letters in mid 1972. This report
presents the preliminary test plan developed through this study.
At the time of this study the reference reactor design had the fol-
lowing approximate characteristics:
Steady-state thermal power, 1500 kW
Steady-state electrical power from thermionic fuel elements, 120 kW
Coolant - liquid sodium-potassium (NaK 78)
Coolant flow rate, 130 000 Ib/hr (16.4 kg/sec)
Core coolant outlet temperature, 1500° F (821° G)
Core coolant AT, 180° F (100° C)
Fuel element sheath and reactor pressure vessel material, columbium -
1% zirconium
Some important technical contributions were made to this study by the
author's co-workers including: Preliminary hazards analysis by W. Maag,
preliminary heat transfer calculations by W. Weiland, and a preliminary
shielding study by L. Soffer. The descriptive information on the SPF was
excerpted from an informal document prepared by the SPF staff entitled,
"Test Equipment Designer's Guide to SPP Capabilities."
APPROACH
The SHSO (through their contractors) would design, fabricate and
deliver the thermionic reactor and reactor control system to the SPP. LeEC
would design and procure the test support equipment and make the necessary
modifications to the SPP capabilities and would set up, check out, conduct,
and dismantle the test. The test would include 24 months of full power
reactor operation.
The total LeEC-SPP effort would span 61/2 years. Scheduling would
be keyed to the date specified for reactor delivery. The test support
equipment would be on hand at the SPP and partially checked out at the time
of reactor delivery.
The vacuum equipment, liquid metal cooling and supply systems, reactor
and local shielding would be mated in the SPP Assembly Area and mounted on
two special rail cars.
The test assembly would be rolled on existing tracks into the SPP
test chamber for final hook up of controls and check out of all systems.
The test would be controlled from the existing control room.
The test chamber atmosphere would be gaseous nitrogen (G^ ) to minimize
the chance for NaK fires. The local vacuum chambers would provide protec-
tion from oxidation to the reactor and primary loops which would be con-
structed of Cb-1Zr. The secondary loops would be constructed principally .
of stainless steel.
The reactor would be cooled by NaK circulating in a dual system con-
sisting of two 'primary loops, two intermediate heat exchangers and two
secondary loops. About 85 percent of the thermal load would be rejected
via radiators from the secondary loops and absorbed by an existing facility
cold wall. The other mode of heat rejection would be conduction through
the G$2 to the facility chamber walls.
The electrical power output from the thermionic fuel elements (TPE's)
would be dissipated to a water cooled resistance load.
Following completion of the 24 month full power test and about 2 weeks
for decay of radioactivity, the test assembly would be rolled out of the
Test Chamber into the SPP Disassembly Area. The spent reactor would be
placed in hot storage or shipped to a disassembly site as specified by the
sponsoring agency.
3SPACE POWER FACILITY (SPF)
The SPF is located at the Plum Brook Station of the NASA Lewis Research
Center, Sandusky, Ohio. The SPF is designed to test space nuclear power
generation and/or propulsion systems under simulated space environmental
conditions including vacuum, thermal, and nuclear conditions.
Figure 1 shows the general arrangement of the SPF. The SPF includes
an aluminum test chamber surrounded by a heavy concrete and steel enclosure
for nuclear shielding and containment, facilities for assembly and dis-
assembly of experiments, a large scale vacuum system, control and data
acquisition systems and supporting facilities„ A cross section of the test
chamber is shown in figure 2.
Test Chamber
The test chamber is a vertical cylinder 100 feet (30.5 m) in diameter
by 72 feet (21.9 m) in height with a hemispherical dome, the top cf which
is 121 feet (36.9 m) above the floor of the chamber. The chamber is con-
structed of type 5083 aluminum which is clad on both surfaces with 1/8 inch
(0.31 cm) thick type 3003 aluminum. The vertical walls are 7/8 inch (2.2
cm) thick while the dome is of 1^  inch (3.1 cm) thick aluminum plate.
The ent'ire aluminum test chamber is designed to withstand structurally,
with a safety factor of 2, a pressure surge of approximately 3*1 psi (2.1
N/cm2) and also to withstand an external static pressure equivalent to 2.5
psi (1.7 N/cm2) applied uniformly to all exterior surfaces. A burst disk
between the annular space and the test chamber is set to prevent this pres-
sure differential from exceeding 2.5 psi (1.7 H/cm2).
The chamber has two 50 by 50 feet (15.2 by 15«2 m) electrically operated
aluminum doors located 180° apart. These doors provide entry to the assembly
and disassembly areas. The doors are curved to fit the cylindrical shape
of the test chamber and are double sealed. Pneumatically operated locking
mechanisms are provided to fasten the doors to the test chamber for leak
tight pressure and vacuum operation.
Other features of the test chamber include an airlock, a polar crane,
a clear 50-foot (15,2-m) floor width working section and a full complement
of service penetrations. The chamber floor is heavily braced to withstand
a load of 200 tons (181 436 kg).
The test chamber is designed to provide an ultimate vacuum of 1x10~5
torr (1.33x10-3 N/m2) or 1x10~8 torr (l.33x10~6 N/m2) with the thermal
shroud. The test chamber is resistant to corrosive vapors (in limited
quantities) and to the radiation environment of a test vehicle nuclear
system and large thermal loads as delineated belows
(a) Temperature: -300° to +180° F (-184° to +82° C) (with use of
thermal shroud)
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(b) Pressure: Atmospheric to 1x10~8 torr (l.33x1CT6 N/m2)
(c) Nuclear radiation at a distance of 10 feet from a source equivalent
to the following radiation levels:
Gamma: 1,7x10^
 r/hr or 3.6x108 r/90 days
Past Neutron: 8.3x10^  n/Cm2 - sec or 6.4x1016 n/cm2 - 90 days
(d) Vapors: NaK, mercury, or cesium
The test chamber includes a movable, water cooled cold wall with cylin-
drical dimensions of 40 feet (12.2 m) diameter by 40 feet (12.2 m) high.
A 20-ton (18 142-kg) overhead crane is provided which may be removed
during testing.
Test Chamber Enclosure
The functions of the test chamber enclosure are to provide a nuclear
radiation shield, to contain the pressure during a maximum credible accident
(MCA), and to protect an evacuated test chamber from atmospheric pressure.
The test chamber enclosure is a concrete enclosure 130 feet (39»6 ni)
in inside diameter which is 7 feet (2.1 m) thick around the cylindrical
portion and 6 feet (1.8 m) thick over the dome. It is 150 feet (45«7 m)
high inside on the vertical center line from the top of the base slab.
There is a 15-foot (4.6-m) wide annulus between the concrete enclosure
and the test chamber exterior surface which can be evacuated to a pressure
of 25 torr (3.3x10* N/m2). The chamber annulus is designed for the follow-
ing environmental conditions:
(a) Pressure: Atmospheric to 25 torr (3«3x10' N/m2)
(b) Nuclear radiation at a distance of 25 feet (7.6 m) from an un-
shielded reactor core having the following radiation levels:
Gamma: 2.7x104
 r/hr or 5.8x10? r/10 days
Past Neutron: 1.3x10^  n/cm2 - sec of 1x101° n/Cm2 - 90 days
Two hydraulically operated concrete doors 50 feet (15»2 m) wide by
50 feet (15.2 m} high by 7 feet (2.1 m) thick, weighing 5 million pounds
(2»3 million kg) each, are provided opening onto the assembly and disassem-
bly areas.
The test chamber enclosure is designed to contair, with a safety factor
of 2, internal pressures from 25 torr to 22.7 psi (3.3x10^  to 15.6x10^  H/m2).
The interior surface of the concrete, with the exception of the dome area,
is covered by a 4-inch (10-cm) layer of borated concrete to minimize neutron
activation of the shield structure. A continuous 1/4 inch (0.62 cm) thick
steel membrane is embedded in the concrete envelope. This membrane provides
further containment against the possible release of radioactive materials
which might result from a nuclear accident within the test chamber. It
also provides vacuum integrity for the partial evacuation of the annular
region between the concrete shield and the test chamber.
A personnel airlock penetrates the concrete enclosure matching a test
chamber airlock. The airlock is sized to allow entry of a tread mounted
robot manipulator. Other penetrations are provided for services such as
electrical and control wiring, fluids, repressurization gas system and
the vacuum system. The penetrations are located below ground level for
shielding purposes. All penetrations are welded. Expansion points are
provided as necessary. Wiring penetrations utilize leak tight multi-pin
connectors. Two isolation valves in series are provided in all penetrating
piping systems. The valves are designed for automatic operation by a high
radiation level in the stack effluent thus containing the radiation sources
within the chamber. The maximum design leakage from the test chamber en-
closure with penetrations blind flanged and doors seal-welded, and with an
22,7 psi (15»6x1c4 N/m^ ) internal pressure is 0.1 percent of the total con-
tained gas per day.
Three television monitors in the test control center can display pic-
tures from three cameras in the chamber located approximately 120° apart
in a horizontal plane. Each camera is controllable over 0° to 335° pan,
0° to 45° tilt, and has a zoom lens. Each camera includes a special spot-
light alined with the camera lens for illumination of the viewing area.
Assembly Area
The assembly area is a steel frame building 75 feet (22.9 m) wide by
150 feet (45.7 m) long with a clear height of 88 feet (26.8 m) to the roof
trusses. .The area is equipped with a 25-ton (22 678-kg) overhead bridge
crane serving the entire length of the building and three sets of railroad
tracks which extend through the test chamber and into the disassembly area.
The structure is designed to accommodate a future 75-"ton (68 032-kg) crane.
Disassembly Area
The disassembly area provides a space 70 feet (21.3 m) wide by 150
feet (45»7 m) long with a clear height of 73 feet f22.3 m) for remote dis-
assembly, cut-up, and disposal of nuclear spacecraft systems after comple-
tion of the environmental test. The structure is constructed of concrete
(varying in thickness from 6 ft (1.8 m) in the walls to 4 f"t (1.2 m) in the
roof) to provide shielding of personnel from gamma radiation from the radio-
active test articles. A hot cell is provided within this area for remote
examination of nuclear reactors and components.
The building is provided with a 20-ton (18 142-kg) overhead bridge
crane.
The design allows for the future addition of an overhead bridge manipu-
lator and two wall type manipulators, one on each side of the building.
Remote operation of this equipment will be from exterior galleries along
the sides of the building utilizing lead glass shielding view windows spaced
to provide complete visual coverage of the operation within the building.
THERMIONIC REACTOR TEST SETUP
The arrangement- of major test equipment is shown schematically in
figure 3. Equipment items to be supplied by Lewis-SPP are listed in table
I. Equipment is required in the following categories:
(1) Reactor system (and controls)
(2) Rail flat cars
(?) Liquid metal cooling, storage, and purification systems
(4) Local vacuum systems
(5) Local shielding
(6) Test control and diagnostic instrumentation
(7) Spent reactor shipping cask
(8) Facility heat rejection and remote handling systems
Protection of Cb-1Zr
Special consideration was given to the need for protecting the Cb-lZr
from oxidation and corrosion in this long-term, high-temperature test. The
precautions to protect against these effects impact heavily on the test
setup and cost. These include:
(1) Protection of internal surfaces in contact with; the reactor primary
coolant NaK; The detrimental effects of corrosion include the loss of pro-
perties and mass transfer which can lead to plugging of coolant passages.
Although present knowledge does not allow for accurate prediction of these
effects in a given loop it does allow for design to hold them to safe
levels. This plan calls for observance of the following three criteria:
(a) Within a given high-temperature loop the containment equipment
in contact with the NaK shall be fabricated from a single material. In this
test the primary loop material shall be of Cb-1Zr to match the reactor pres-
sure vessel and fuel element sheath tubes. The secondary loops (lower temp-
eratures) shall be constructed primarily from stainless steels.
(b) The oxygen contamination level in the NaK shall be controlled
to not greater than 10 ppm during long test periods.
(c) The impurity level shall be controlled in containment mater-
ials in accordance with specifications to be detailed later.
(2) Protection of external surfaces of Cb°°1Zr in contact with the test
ambient environment; These surfaces must be protected against oxidizing
environments to prevent embrittlement and loss of properties. This plan pro-
vides this protection by isolating the Cb-1Zr material from the SPP test chamber
environment by enclosing the primary loop in vacuum chambers with suitably
low oxidizing potential. Experience in other programs (ref. 1) has shown
that adequate protection of Gb-1Zr is provided when the oxygen partial pres-
sure (P02) is controlled to approximately 1x10"10 torr (l«33x10"8 N/m2).
This K>2 level can be maintained by pumping to a total pressure of approxi-
mately 1x10~® torr (1.33x10-6 N/m2) provided the pumping equipment does
not contribute reactive species to the pumped region. The vacuum systems
included in this plan meet these criteria and are similar to those used
in the reference 1 program. Each of the three vacuum pumping systems shall
include:
(a) Turbo-molecular pumps for high pumping speeds of all species
during bakeouts and pumpdowns.
(b) Ion pumps for the long term pumping of all species to main-
tain 10~8 torr (1.33x10-° N/m2). Redundant pumps shall be provided.
(c) Titanium sublimation pumps to remove reactive species during
periods of sporadically high off-gassing.
Vacuum will be monitored with ion gages and by monitoring the ion pump
currents.
Heat Rejection Systems °
This plan calls for two parallel heat rejection systems with a total
flow rate in the primary loops of 130 000 pounds per hour (16.4 kg/sec).
Each system would be sized to remove 50 percent of the total thermal heat
load of 1500 kilowatts. Both systems would be flowing during normal oper-
ations. In the event of a leak in one system the isolation valves for
that system would be closed and the reactor scrammed. Uninterrupted flow
would be provided by the remaining system to cool the shutdown core. Iso-
lation valves would serve to prevent gross leakage and would not be re-
quired to provide 100 percent sealing. This is a realistic capability for
valves with refractory metal seating materials.
Other safety design aspects of the heat rejection systems would include
design for convective flow and provisions for partial emergency power to the
8pumps in the event that main facility power is lost. As previously men-
tioned the SPF environment external to the local vacuum chambers would be
GN2 to minimize the chance of NaK fires. This nitrogen could also be used
as a coolant for the electromagnetic pumps, flow meters, and test support
vacuum pumps.
Some aspects of the heat rejection system are directed toward mini-
mizing the size of the refractory metal loops. Intermediate heat exchangers
(HDC's) are included. The IHX's are designed to maintain the secondary
loops about J00° F (167° C) cooler than the primary loops. This will allow
the secondary loops, including long lines and radiators, to be fabricated
of stainless steel. If the final reactor design outlet temperature is
actually less than 1500° F (821° C) (e.g., 1400° F (?60° C)) this can be
accommodated without lowering the radiator temperature by adjusting the
conductivity across the IHX's. One means of doing this would be to include
a binary gas gap between the Cb-1Zr and stainless steel surfaces. Conduc-
tivity could be controlled by adjustments of the gas mixture (e.g., a He-Ze
system).
Approximately 85 percent of the total thermal heat load will be expelled
through the radiators and absorbed by the facility cold wall (existing).
This heat is removed from the facility by a circulating water system. The
other mode of heat transfer is convective cooling by the environmental
nitrogen. This heat is eventually conducted out through the test chamber
walls. Preliminary calculations indicate the steady-state average temper-
ature of the N2 to be approximately 155° F (68° C) and the aluminum chamber
walls to be approximately 115° F (46° G). Additional cooling capability
will be provided for the dissipation of heat from a resistance electric
load of about 120 kVe and possibly for cooling the local concrete shield
to control dehydration.
Local Shielding
A preliminary study was conducted to establish the approximate local
shielding requirements. Nominal equipment compositions and weights were
used. Plots were constructed of maximum radiation level at the local shield
outer surface following reactor shutdown. Three radiation sources would
be contributing: core decay gammas, radioactive primary NaK, and radioactive
components. It was assumed that no fission products would be present in
the primaisr NaK. Figure 4 shows plots of radiation level against shield
thickness for various decay times. It was concluded that with 4 feet (1.2 m)
of local concrete shielding personnel could enter the test chamber for
manual work about 14 days after reactor shutdown. As indicated in figure 3
multiple vacuum chambers would be used rather than one large chamber. This
would facilitate pumping and would also allow the core shield to be smaller
and to protect most of the test support equipment.
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TEST OPERATION
A step-by-step sequence of planned events is listed below.
(1) SPF facility handling equipment procured and installed. Facility
water cooling system -upgraded from present 1 megawatt capability to approx-
imate 2 megawatt capability.
(2) Liquid metal heat rejection system components procured and inspected.
(3) Special flat car assembled in SPF assembly area,
(4) Vacuum systems and shield installed on flat car.
(5) Liquid metal heat rejection system mounted on test support struc-
ture and structure mounted on flat car.
(6) Reactor, controls, and instrumentation delivered to SPF assembly
area,
(7) Instrumentation installed in control room.
(8) Reactor (without reflector drums) installed in vacuum tank and
shield and secured according to mounting flange design. (Piping stubs,
instrumentation leads, and electrical load conductor are arranged to pene-
trate the shield.)
(9) NaK heat rejection system piping manually welded to reactor piping
stubs and other interconnections made between vacuum tanks.
(10) Entire NaK system cleaned and back filled with inert gas. MaK
inventory stored in drain and fill tank.
(11) Flat car rolled on rail tracks from assembly area into SPF test
chamber and secured to chamber floor.
(12) Electrical hookup and test support equipment water and nitrogen
hookups completed.
(15) NaK system charged by pressurizing the NaK tank. Purity levels
checked with system being heated by electrical heater. All mechanical test
support equipment checked out.
(14) With system again at room temperature, the reflector drums are
manually installed and the local shield and vacuum tank are closed.
(15) SPF cold wall assembled around radiators. Cold wall circulation
checked.
(16) Chamber cleared, sealed, evacuated, and back filled with N2 gas.
(Evacuation will not be prolonged because off-gassing is not essential (and
10
probably not practical with the concrete shielding present). This procedure
will require about 48 hr.)
(17) Local vacuum chambers baked out and test vacuum achieved.
(18) Mater circulation in cold wall established*
(15) Reactor nuclear check out and low power runs accomplished. Tele-
vision surveillance provided.
(20) Full power testing accomplished. (This is the long term (24 month)
test.) Television surveillance provided.
(21) Following test completion, system NaK is again transferred to the
NaK tank.
(22) Radioactive NaK allowed to decay. Test chamber again evacuated
with effluent gas passing through absolute particle filters and gas absorb-
ers. Effluent gas activity monitored and pumping rate adjusted if neces-
sary to meet release criteria*
(23) Following evacuation, chamber back filled with air. Personnel
enter and manually disconnect water and instrumentation lines. (Radiation
levels are anticipated to be low enough to permit personnel to accomplish
this work after the reactor has been shut down for 14 days.)
(24) System moved to hot disassembly area.
(2.c) Shield and vacuum tank opened. (A 20-ton (18 142 kg) crane, remote
handling equipment, and remote operation viewing stations are available in
this area. A special hot cell is accessible from this area.)
(26) Reflector drums removed from reactor and reactor loaded into the
transfer cask for shipment or stored in the facility hot storage pit as
required.
PRELIMINARY HAZARDS ANALYSIS
A preliminary analysis of the hazards of operating a thermionic reactor
in the SPF was prepared. This analysis indicates that the maximum credible
accident (MCA) postulated for this test can be withstood provided the amount
of NaK (or other reactive liquid metal) in the system is less than 1600
pounds (726 kg).
The MCA results from a nuclear excursion that occurs during a reactor
startup after the reactor has been operated previously and therefore con-
tains a full inventory of fission products. The MCA occurs while the SPF
chambers still contain air at 40° F (4.4° C) and 14.2 psia (9.8 N/cm2)
(atmospheric pressure at Plum Brook site). The SPF consists of an inner
aluminum chamber of 890 000 cubic feet (25 200 m3) and an outer reinforced
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concrete enclosure of 1 620 000 cubic feet (45 873 m3). The inner chamber
is pressure rated at 3*1 psi (2.1 N/cm2) and the outer at 8.0 psi (5«5
N/cm2) above external conditions. The latter is designed for a maximum
leak rate of 0.1 percent (by volume) per day at 8 psi (5»5 N/cm2) above
external conditions. An allowable leak rate for the SPF has been calcu-
lated to be 0.2 percent per day based on a 15 megawatt reactor accident
and the dose limits of 10 CFR 100.11 .
The heat energy released by the MCA is assumed to be transferred to
the chamber air which results in some maximum chamber pressure. The total
energy release consists of: (1) the heat content of the NaK heat transfer
fluid, (2) the exothermic heat of formation for the oxidation of NaK, and
(3) the energy of the nuclear excursion which was assumed to be 150C
megawatt-second as reported in reference 2.
The results, presented in figure 5, show the chamber pressure result-
ing from the MCA as related to the total weight of NaK in the system. It
is assumed the aluminum chamber ruptures and the resulting pressure refers
to the concrete enclosure. At a NaK system weight of 1600 pounds (726 kg)
the enclosure pressure reaches the maximum allowable 8.0 psi (5.5 N/cm^ )
above external conditions.
The system of figure 1 is assumed to contain a maximum of 1400 pounds
(635 kg) oi NaK. The MCA for this system would result in the following
energy release and chamber conditions.
NaK in system, Ib (kg)
Chamber volume, ft* (m3)
Initial chamber temperature,
op (oc)
Initial chamber pressure,
psia (N/cm2)
Air in chamber,
Ib-moles (kg-moles)
Heat release, M Btu (Mj)
Heat content of NaK
Chemical reaction of NaK
Nuclear excursion
Total
Final chamber temperature,
op (oc)
Final chamber pressure,
psia
Aluminum test
chamber
1400 (635)
890 000 (25 200)
40 (4.4)
14.2 (9.8)
2350 (1066)
6.38x105
5.91x10^
1.45x106
8.05x106
503 (262)
27.3 (18.8)
Test chamber
enclosure
1400 (635)
1 620 000 (45 873)
40 (4.4)
14.2 (9.8)
4290 (1946)
604
5600
1420
7624
6.38xic5)
5.91x10°)
1.45x10°)
8.05x10°)
294 (146)
21.4 (14.8)
This MCA would rupture the burst disk between the test chamber and enclosure
annulus and might rupture the test chamber. The enclosure would be expected
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to contain the MCA so as to limit the total leak rate to less than 0,1
percent per day. As indicated above this is a safe leak rate for a 15 meg-
awatt reactor accident and should therefore be very conservative for this
1,5 megawatt reactor test.
This preliminary analyses indicates that adequate safety margin exists
to assure the containment of the MCA, However, it appears prudent that
consideration should be given to altering the reference design to provide
double containment of the core coolant. This would reduce the probability
of a release of radioactivity within the facility in the event of a rupture
of the primary reactor pressure vessel.
SCHEDULE
Figure 6 is an activity schedule for testing a thermionic reactor at
SPF. This schedule indicates that a reactor could be accepted for instal-
lation about 31/2 years after the initiation of activity. The total
Lewis-SPF effort for the test would require about 6 1/2 years assuming 2
years of uninterrupted, full power reactor operation.
COST ESTIMATE
Table I is an itemized estimate of cost of important test support equip-
ment that would be provided by Lewis Research Center, Other major equipment
cost such as facility modifications and remote handling equipment are in-
cluded in SPF Preparation costs. These are listed in table II, Table II
also lists the total Lewis-SPF estimated cost per year of effort for the
thermionic reactor test at SPF.
MANPOWER
The estimated Lewis-SPF manpower requirements per year of effort are
listed in table III, The total requirement is approximately 224 man years
of engineering and technical support spread over 6 1/2 years.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
It was concluded from this preliminary study that the SPF is a suitable
test site for a thermionic reactor of the design being developed by the
SNSO in 1972.
Since the reactor pressure vessel and primary loop piping would be fab-
ricated from Cb-1Zr, a refractory metal alloy, local vacuum chambers would
be required to protect these components from oxidation. The incorporation
of intermediate heat exchangers and stainless steel secondary loops would
help minimize the quantities of refractory material.
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Facility modifications would "be required to increase the cooling capacity
of the existing water-circulation cold-wall system. Other major cost items
include remote handling equipment, liquid metal cooling system, and a liquid
metal handling system.
Test scheduling would be keyed to the reactor delivery. Facility prepa-
rations and test support equipment buildup would require about 3 1/2 years,
The total activity for a single 2 year full power test would span about
6 1/2 years.
The test was estimated to cost about 11 to 14 million dollars based on
1972 rates. The total manpower requirement was estimated to be 224 Jasai
years of Lewis-SPF engineering and technical support.
REFERENCES
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TABLE I. - TEST SUPPORT EQUIPMENT COST
(Thousands of 1972 dollars fj
Cost
Liquid metal system:
HaK purification and storage equipment 550
Electro-magnetic pumps, BMP (4) 1000
Intermediate heat exchangers, IHX (2) 400
Hadiators (2) 500
Flow meters (4) 18
Electric heaters (4) 40
Expansion reservoirs, RSVR (4) 500
Isolation valves (4) 120
Piping and insulation 40
Instrumentation and controls 300
Vacuum tanks and pump systems (3) 300
Experiment instrumentation 400
Component testing 700
Shielding 150
Test structures 100
Rail car 100
Electric load 25
Engineering studies 200
TSE total 5443
TABLE II. - TOTAL COST DISTRIBUTION FOR THERMIONIC REACTOR TEST AT SPP
[Costs in thousands of 1972 dollarstj
Year of effort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totals
SPF preparation 450 843 843 300 2 436
SPP operations
direct & indirect 300 600 600 300 1 800
Test support
equipment 1618 2203 1389 233 5 443
Research operations
support 152 208 248 312 408 304 160 1 792
Totals 2220 3254 2480 1145 1008 904 460 11 471
Total cost plus 25 percent contingency 14 339
«a
1972 dollars are subject to yearly escalations depending on the date of
initiation of effort.
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TABLE III. - MANPOWER ESTIMATE FOE THERMIONIC REACTOR
TEST AT SPF
Man-years
Year of effort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SPF
Engineering 6 6 6 6' .14 13 8
Technicians 4 8 16 25 25 12
Sub-total 6 10 14 22 39 38 20
LeRC (Engineering) 13 16 1? 1? 12
Total man-years 19 26 31 39 51 38 20
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Figure 2. - Cross section through Test Chamber - Space Power Facility.
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